



phantasìa, imagination, noûs: on the relation between 




Analytica posterior II 19 treats the problem of how we can reach the àmesai 
archài of science, which is the main task of the intellect: that chapter describes 
the main èrgon of the human intellect and the genesis of the intellectus in habitu. 
In De anima III 4-6, Aristotle faces the problem of what is intellect, and of which 
its conditions of existence could be: its matter and its efficient cause. Unluckily, 
Aristotle does not treat in a similar way, in one or more chapters of his works, 
the problem of how the cooperation between intellect and other parts of the soul 
works: this means that we do not have an explanation, from Aristotle’s part, of 
the normal, everyday activities of the human reason and mind, which is 
characterized by an overall cooperation between the intellect already in habitu, 
sense-perception, memory, imagination etc. But the many fragmentary 
statements we can get from various texts seem to suggest that Aristotle actually 
had such a theory. What we can do, is just to collect these few hints he gives us, 
and try to draw a sketch of how his theory could look like. I will try to perform 
this task by addressing the problem of the relation between the nòēma, the 
cognitive state in which the activity of intellect is realized, and the cognitive 
states in which are realized the activities of sense-perception and phantasìa, that 
is àisthēma and phàntasma. I think that in this way we will be able to reach some 
hints also about the psychological ‘mechanism’ which Aristotle seems to 
presuppose as an explanation of the intellect’s power to generate a lògos.1 
 
The dependence of the exercise of thought on the presence of a phàntasma as 
its material condition is clearly stated by Aristotle in a famous sentence in the 
De memoria et reminiscentia (1, 449b31): 
νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος 
it is impossible to think without a phàntasma2. 
This fact implies that the nòēma, the cognitive state in which the act of 
thinking is realized3, is embodied through its link to one or more phantàsmata. 
The phàntasma is a sensory or perceptual stimulus which either (1) is the relic 
of a past exercise of sense-perception or (2) is the result of the mix of various 
                                                          
1 I treated the problem of the genesis of the intellect in habitu in my paper In confinio sensus 
et intellectus. APo. Β 19 in “Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale”, 20, 2009, 
pp. 73-93; after that, I treated the problem of what intellect is in Ordine, intelligenza e 
intelligibilità del cosmo nel De anima di Aristotele (III 4-5), « Methodos », 16, 2016, La notion 
d'Intelligence (nous-noein) dans la Grèce antique. De Homère au Platonisme,  
https://methodos.revues.org/4410 . I come here to approach the third part of the triptych: the 
problem of how intellect works. 
2 Apart from where explicitly stated, all translations are of my own. 
3 The term “nòēma” is not very common in the corpus, but is pervasively used in De anima 
III 6, where Aristotle treats the problem of how intellect performs the task of synthesis between 
two or more noḕmata. For a discussion of its meaning, see Feola, Ordine, intelligenza, cit. 
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relics of past exercises of sense-perception4. We know that Aristotle thought that 
many phantàsmata can mix and form a new, more complex, phàntasma: this is 
the way in which, according to Aristotle, dreams are produced5; this is also the 
condition that allows people who ‘manipulate’ their mental landscapes to 
produce their sets of mnemonic ‘places’6. In all these cases, the mixing of many 
phantàsmata produces a new phàntasma, and, according to the doctrine of the 
four causes, it would be obvious to describe the relation between the original 
phantàsmata and the new one as a matter-sýnolon-form relationship. Also the 
relationship between the phàntasma(ta) and the nòēma should be, in principle, 
described as a matter-sýnolon-form relationship: we can see, in fact, that 
Aristotle describes it with the usual wording “ouk àneu” which describes the 
hypothetical necessity relationship in general, and, more specifically, the matter-
sýnolon-form relation. So, a question arises: in which way does the relation 
between the complex phàntasma and the simpler original ones differ from the 
relation between the nòēma and the phàntasmata? 
Why the union of many phantàsmata produces a more complex phàntasma 
in some cases, while in some other cases it gives birth to a nòēma? In which way 
do these two instances of union differ? 
 
φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας· αὐτή τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ 
αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις. (De anima, III 3, 427b14-16) 
Phantasìa, in fact, is something different both from sense-perception and from 
intelligence: it doesn’t come to be on its own without sense-perception, and without 
it there can be no belief. 
De anima III 3, which is usually described as a chapter about ‘imagination’ 
could perhaps be more properly described as a chapter about the differences 
between the various cognitive powers of the soul. The main part of the chapter 
is a detailed dialectic discussion about how each particular cognitive power 
differs from other powers. The result of this discussion is that, in the map of the 
various powers, there is a blank place, which must be filled by the so called 
“phantasìa”. The second half of the chapter (427b27-429a9) is a short treatise 
on the definition of ‘phantasìa’, while the first half (427a17-b26) tells us that the 
map of the cognitive powers is defective because it lacks an appropriate 
description of what is midway between sense-perception and intelligence. It is 
important to notice that III 3 does not give us a detailed discussion about how 
the entrance in the theoretical landscape of phantasìa (which is defined only at 
the end of the chapter, in 429a1-2) should solve the many problems raised in the 
                                                          
4 For more details about how the concept of ‘perceptual stimulus / sensory motion’ should be 
construed in Aristotles’ psychology, see G. Feola, Il moto fantastico-percettivo secondo 
Aristotele (Aristotle on the nature of sensorial stimuli), in « Lexicon Philosophicum. An 
international Journal for the History of Texts and Ideas », 3, 2015, 
http://lexicon.cnr.it/index.php/LP/article/view/452/361 . 
5 De insomniis, 3, 460b28-461a11 and 461b17-22. 
6 This is what emerges from treatises on mnemotechnics as f.i. Rhetorica ad Herennium III, 
Cicero’s De oratore II, 350-360, and Quintilianus’ Institutio oratoria XI: in reading the second 
chapter of De memoria et reminiscentia, we have to be aware that the cultural landscape of 
Aristotle’s text are practices as these. 
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previous parts of the chapter. After that Aristotle has told us that the map of the 
cognitive powers is defective, he adds phantasìa to the picture; but he does not 
tells us how exactly the presence of phantasìa makes the picture less defective. 
I think that the entrance of phantasìa in the theoretical framework does 
actually solve the problem Aristotle has here set, because those problems were 
generated by a lack of concern with the genetical relationships between the 
various levels of the cognitive soul, and the entrance of phantasìa in this 
landscape adds exactly what Aristotle needed: a genetical point of view on the 
connections among the powers7. Here, again, we find the key-words “ouk àneu”: 
sense-perception is the material condition of phantasìa, and phantasìa is the 
material condition of belief (i.e. propositional thought). Anyway, what concerns 
us here, is the fact that this passage clearly treats phantasìa as something which 
is in a (still) indefinite place midway between sense-perception and thought, 
something which is strictly necessary in order that the mediation between sense-
perception and thought can be performed. 
Anyway, we do not know anything about how exactly Aristotle construed the 
relation between phantàsmata and noḕmata. At least, we do not know anything 
yet. Let us have a look to another passage: 
 
ὧν […] ταῦτα [int. γράμματα, φωναί, l. 5] σημεῖα πρώτων, ταὐτὰ πᾶσι παθήματα 
τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὥν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα πράγματα ἤδη ταὐτά. 
The ‘first’ things, of which these other things [int. the letters and vocal sounds] are 
signs, are, for all of us, the same affections of the soul; and the items of which these 
[affections] are resemblances are the things in themselves, of course identical (Int. 
1, 16a6-8) 
How can Aristotle feel to be entitled to say that the soul’s affections are the 
same “for all of us”? It seems obvious that my thoughts are mine, your thoughts 
are yours! Under which description can they be described as “the same”? 
Aristotle is here speaking about communication; what matters, for two people to 
effectively communicate something to each other, is that the intentional objects 
meant by the two are the same. I think that the straightest construal of this 
passage is that (according to the famous principle that each cognitive act is 
defined by its object) the thoughts of two or more people can be the same 
thoughts, if they have the same content and they are about the same intentional 
objects. 
So, the question arises: how can two people think to just one (and the same) 
intentional object? If we bear in mind the hypothesis that the relation between 
phantàsma(ta) and nòēma is a matter-form relation, and if we bear in mind, 
moreover, the famous principle according to which the same form can be 
realized in different matters if these different matters share the properties that 
are relevant for the realization of that form, we can set the hypothesis that (1) a 
nòēma is defined by its intentional object, (2) two people that think to one and 
the same intentional object have the same nòēma, (3) this one form, the nòēma 
                                                          
7 I argued in favour of this thesis in my book Phàntasma e Phantasìa. Illusione e apparenza 
sensibile nel De anima di Aristotele, Loffredo, Napoli, 2012. 
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which is the same for the two people, can be enmattered in sets of phantàsmata 
which are peculiar to each of the two people. 
So, this passage, joint with this other one 
τὰ μὲν οὖν εἶδη τὸ νοητικόν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ 
the power of thinking thinks the forms in the phantàsmata (De anima, III 7, 431b2), 
seems to confirm that the relation between the nòēma and the phantàsma(ta) 
pertains to the matter-form kind of relation. 
And, following this line of enquiry, we also have reached a relevant point: 
what Aristotle calls “nòēma” is not the sýnolon, it is the form; the sýnolon is that 
particular instance of thinking, performed by that particular person, whose 
matter are that particular phantàsmata. 
I think that Aristotle could have thought to something like the following: 
perhaps, when we think to the universal horse, you imagine a white horse, while 
I imagine a black one; but, as far as these two phantàsmata share, in your and 
my acts of cognition, the same role of exemplifying the concept horse, they are 
perfectly equivalent. Their difference turns out to be important, if we cease to 
treat them as matter of our nòēma, and we go back to their roles in our exercises 
of phantasìa: from this second point of view, they present to us two different 
intentional objects (phantastic objects, not conceptual ones), a white and a black 
horse, and they are therefore different. 
 
Let us, now, see a very famous passage about how phantasìa works for the 
sake of the activities of the intellect (or, if we prefer, how intellect works on the 
materials that phantasìa provides), Mem. 1, 450a1-5: 
τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἐν τῷ νοεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ διαγράφειν· ἐκεῖ τε γὰρ οὐθὲν προσχρώμενοι 
τῷ τὸ ποσὸν ὡρισμένον εἶναι τοῦ τριγόνου, ὅμως γράφομεν ὡρισμένον κατὰ τὸ 
ποσὸν, καὶ ὁ νοῶν ὡσαύτως, κἂν μὴ ποσὸν νοῇ, τίθηται πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποσόν, νοεῖ 
δ’ οὐκ ῇ ποσόν· 
It happens the same thing in thinking and in drawing geometric sketches: also in this 
second case, even if we do not do any use of the fact that the triangle is of a definite 
size, we anyway draw it of a definite size; the person who thinks is doing something 
similar: even if he does not think to something which has a size, sets in front of his 
mind’s eye something which has a size, but he thinks to it as something without a 
size. 
The main feature of intellectual activity (there is no need, here, to distinguish 
between intellect and reason, even if the distinction is very important in other 
contexts) is that the power of abstraction frees it from the bounds of the sense 
data. Two different triangles, being different in magnitude, can cover two 
different portions of my visual horizon; therefore, their two phantàsmata will be 
recalled in imagined landscapes in which they will (again) occupy different 
portions; but what’s important is that my intellect can select the features of the 
phàntasma that are relevant for that specific instance of thought: if I have to 
think about a geometric theorem which is about every triangle, the dimension of 
that triangle will be pointless, and I can discard it. What does it mean that I can 
discard it? It means that I will not use it: I will use only the features of the 
phàntasma that correspond to features of its intentional object that are relevant 
to the theorem, f.i. the features of the phàntasma that correspond to that 
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particular feature of the intentional object which is the sum of its angles. And 
this ability implies that I can use different phantàsmata of different triangles, 
given that these triangles all have the same sum of the angles; that I can change 
the ratio among the lengths of the sides; that I can ‘manipulate’ the phàntasma 
in various ways. 
How can this be possible? I think that the only way in which Aristotle could 
provide a viable answer to this problem, would be by allowing that our storage 
of phantàsmata can be so dense and full that it can be an effective substitute of 
external reality, and so flexible and open to re-combination that it can provide 
fulfilment to almost every need of the intellect. To be sincere, Aristotle never 
and nowhere tells something similar. But his mention of the existence of a 
“phantasìa which is ruled by lògos” (φαντασία λογιστική, De anima III 10, 
433b29) seems to point in this direction: the possibility of combining signs in 
the infinite number of ways which is allowed by the possibility of combining 
word and, with the words, the phantàsmata which always accompany them, 
seems to be exactly what Aristotle here needs. 
To resume: the association of phantàsmata to words, and the indefinite 
possibilities of combinations of words, and therefore of phantàsmata, can 
provide our imagination with an indefinite number of specimens of each species 
and genre; and this, in turn, provides the possibility of changing at will the 
features of the specimen(s) that I am imagining while I think to a species or 
genre, therefore noticing that there are some properties of the specimens that do 
not depend on the particular features of this or that specimen: universal 
properties. It is not necessary to examine all the possible specimens: this would 
be impossible; by noticing what depends on the features that my imagination 
puts in the object (sheer accidents: in the example of triangles, their dimensions) 
and what does not depends on them (essential properties: in the case of triangle, 
the fact that its angles sum to 180º, which is a good example because it is 
something which can be verified by a very simple geometric drawing), I am ipso 
facto noticing what is essential and what is not. 
 
The hypothesis of reconstruction I have set forth about Aristotle’s theory on 
the relation between intellect, reason, language and phantasìa, seems to credit 
Aristotle with a strictly empiricist theory of knowledge. So, what about imagined 
objects? What about objects which are not real, or which are impossible? And 
what about objects which, as the intentional objects of scientific theories or of 
our everyday guesses about reality, just could be real (but could also be not)? 
After all, Aristotle, in his dialectic discussions, uses thoroughly the procedure of 
reductio ad absurdum, which was very common in his days’ mathematics; and 
the reductio ad absurdum is a procedure which asks for the philosopher or 
scientist to imagine and examine in a rigorous way something which, at the end 
of the reasoning, will be proved as false and not existent. 
Let us see another passage: 
 
ὅτι δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ νόησις καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφ’ 
ἡμῖν ἐστίν, ὅταν βουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς 
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μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες), δοξάζειν δ’ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ 
ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ἢ ἀληθεύειν. 
Clearly thinking is not the same thing as believing. For the former is in our own 
power, whenever we please: for we can represent an object before our eyes, as do 
those who range objects under mnemonic headings and picture them to themselves. 
But opining is not in our power, for the belief that we hold must be either false or 
true. (De anima, III 3, 427b17-218) 
Here Aristotle seems to distinguish between two ways of using the power of 
thought: in the second one, thought is bound to state something about reality, 
and has to be necessarily either true or false; in the first one, the use of thought 
is not bound to the necessity of stating something about reality, and therefore it 
is not necessarily true or false: there is a suspension of belief, which seems to be 
the same kind of suspension of belief that we perform when we construe a 
mathematical hypothesis we want to examine but which we have not yet 
accepted or discarded. Another way to describe this opposition would be by 
distinguishing the thought as a process which moves from hypothesis to 
hypothesis, from conditions to consequences, from the belief as the result of this 
process, as the ultimate consequence of our line of reasoning. What Aristotle 
here says, is that we are not free to choose our own beliefs: if we are truly 
investigating some subject, the belief which is the ultimate result of our 
reasoning will result as such to us on account of the real or presumed strength of 
its reasons, and it will impose itself to us as true (or, at least, as more probable 
than the opposite belief). Aristotle tells also another thing, here: that there is 
another usage of thought, in which we are more free. This is the way of using 
thought which is not bound to the aim of being true: when we explore a new 
scientific hypothesis, we do not know yet if this hypothesis will turn out to be 
true or not; we are just curious about it, and we draw in a rigorous way all its 
consequences. 
It is important to notice that this usage of thought is not restricted to the 
performance of acts of theoretical thinking. In 427b21-24 Aristotle provides an 
example for his distinction between thought-as-process and belief, taking his 
example from the field of practical behaviour: 
 
ὄταν μὲν δοξάσωμεν δεινόν τι ἢ φοβερόν, εὐθὺς συμπάσχομεν, ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν 
θαρραλέον· κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ 
τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα. 
When we are of opinion that something is terrible or alarming, we at once feel the 
corresponding emotion, and so, too, with what is reassuring. But in the act of 
phantasìa we are no more affected than if we saw in a picture the objects which 
inspire terror or confidence. (De anima III 3, 427b21-249) 
We can picture to ourselves situations in which we are faced with horrible 
sufferings or with sublime happiness, without being so stupid to believe in the 
truth of our imaginations. This fact, which is open to the experience of all of us, 
                                                          
8 Translation by R.D. Hicks (Aristotle. De Anima, with translation, introduction and notes, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1907; reprinted by Ayer Company, Publishers, inc., 
Salem, New Hampshire, 1988), save for the substitution of “belief” to “opinion”. 
9 I preferred here to change Hick’s translation. 
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is used by Aristotle as an evidence for the existence of a ‘realm’, the realm of 
imagination, whose main feature is that of not being bound to the necessity of 
presenting things or facts as necessarily existent or not existent, real or not real: 
if only phantasìa were at work, the construction of these imaginary landscapes 
would be simply an instance of falseness; but at work, here, is also reason, which 
rules over phantasìa in the construction of such landscapes, and which can, 
therefore, testify to itself that such landscapes are not real: so, while the 
phantasìa that presents the landscape is actually false, its falseness turns out to 
be pointless, because the more complex cognitive act, which encompasses both 
this phantasìa and the consciousness that I produced it, is neither false nor true. 
This complex game between reason and phantasìa is something far more 
elaborate than the simple phantasìa as decaying sense which will be defined at 
the end of the chapter (429a1-2): it is clear enough that this kind of phantasìa 
can be treated as an instance of thought because it is something which cannot be 
reduced to a sheer result of sensory activities, being the product of manipulation 
of phantàsmata by reason. This same passage shows as well that Aristotle is 
prepared to enlarge the region of thought very far from the land of pure intellect, 
and to encompass in it a lot of cognitive activities which are more complex than 
simple sense-perception but could hardly enter in a notion of thought as ‘faculty 
which deals with universals’. Which activities, exactly? Given that the 
opposition ‘particular / universal objects’ cannot work here, we should ask if 
there is another criterion which Aristotle uses, in deciding which acts should be 
treated as instances of such an enlarged concept of ‘thought’. 
It seems that this criterion is the fact of being or not being up to us, “in our 
power”. 
 
τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον ἡ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις, ἡ δ’ ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου· ταῦτα δ’ 
ἐν αὐτῇ πώς ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ. διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν βούληται, αἰσθάνεσθαι 
δ’ οὐκ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ· ἀναγχαῖον γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τὸ αἰσθητόν. 
actual sensation is always of particulars, while knowledge is of universals: and these 
universals are, in a manner, in the soul itself. Hence it is in our power to think 
whenever we please, but sensation is not in our power: for the presence of the 
sensible object is necessary. (De anima, II 5, 417b22-26, translation by R.D. Hicks) 
Here Aristotle clearly states that what makes the thought of universals ‘up to 
us’ is the fact that they, in a manner, are in the soul: I think that the straightest 
construal of Aristotle’s thought, here, is that the particulars, as such, have to be 
out there in order to be perceived (if they are not out there, what we have is 
phantasìa, not sense-perception), while the universals we have already grasped 
can be recalled whenever we want just by telling their names (‘dog’, ‘man’, 
‘triangle’, etc.), because our phantasìa obeys to our usage of language, and a set 
of phàntasmata which embodies the appropriate nòēma is promptly recalled 
when I tell the name of the thing. What is common both to the concept of 
‘thinking’ (noêsai) of II 5 and to the concept of ‘thought’ (nòēsis) of III 3, 
notwithstanding the difference in scope between them (in II 5 the scope of the 
thought seems to be limited to theoretical thought, while in III 3 the scope has 




The “objects-in-the-soul” are purely intentional objects, or (if we have to be 
more precise) objects which are considered just as intentional objects, bracketing 
their existence or inexistence in the world. 
 
If we want to resume, we could say that the need to distinguish between sense-
perception and intelligence brings Aristotle to discover, in De anima III 3, a 
border land between the two spheres; the main feature of this border land, is the 
fact that the cognitive activities that are performed in it stem from the land of 
sense-perception and grow towards the land of intelligence. Aristotle construes 
the matter-form link which holds between phantàsmata and noḕmata in order 
that the power of reference with which the noeîn is endowed could be freed as 
much as it is possible from that of the phantasìa. Indeed, between phantasìa and 
noûs there is the space of imagination: what allows the noûs the power to 
perform cognitive operations which are not strictly bound to the sense-data is the 
power of the soul of building intentional objects which lack any reference to 
reality, and this power is allowed by the possibility to combinate words 
according to rules which are the rules of language, rules that are different from 
the rules of external reality. 
Such a power pertains, to be sincere, according to Aristotle, also to that kind 
of phantasìa which is not ruled by language: otherwise, Aristotle could not think 
that some non-human, non-linguistic animals, do have the power of picturing 
and imagining behaviours which can lead to the resolutions of problems and 
puzzles (see Historia animalium, VIII, throughout): so, it is clear that Aristotle 
credits at least some non-linguistic animals with the ability of picturing, 
visualizing, imagining possible courses of action. Aristotle can formulate such 
an hypothesis, because he thinks that these animals are able to perform, by using 
just their complex phantasìai, cognitive acts which are analogous to the acts 
which human mind can perform (HA. VIII 1, 588a18-31). But it is clear that a 
linguistic mind has (for the reasons we have specified) such a power in a far 
greater measure. 
Such a power is the power of combining the phantàsmata in combinations 
which are different from how they appeared in the animal’s previous 
experiences, and therefore of imagining things and situations which do not exist, 
or which do not exist yet but could exist; or even things and situations which 
cannot exist at all, but whose existence is anyway conceivable. 
 
καὶ γὰρ ὁ τραγέλαφος σημαίνει μέν τι, οὔπω δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος κτλ. 
And in fact ‘deergoat’ too means something; but it does not mean the true or false 
yet (Int. 1, 16a16-18) 
The deergoat is something that does not exist but whose existence can be 
imagined, due to the fact that Greek language can connect the word for “goat” 
to the word for “deer”. If I can imagine it, I can construe meaningful hypotheses 
about its properties, and the subject of these hypotheses must be different from 
sheer nothing: about nothing no meaningful discourse can be done. 
PS – the deergoat (Tragelaphus scriptus) has been discovered, real and alive, 
in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1766. 
